It shouldn’t surprise readers that the United States successfully carried out an operation to capture and remove Nicolás Maduro this weekend. I’ve been discussing a U.S. pivot toward South America for some time, and if there were any lingering doubts about the Trump administration’s intentions, they should be dispelled now. From confirmed reports, the operation involved Delta Force extracting Maduro and his wife from their residence in Caracas with strikingly little resistance—thanks in part to CIA assets and what appears to have been insider facilitation within his circle. This raises questions about whether elements of his own regime prioritized survival over loyalty.
Speculating on what comes next is always a bit of a fool’s errand (and my favorite part), but here are three plausible scenarios, ranked by likelihood as I see it:
- Most probable: Interim continuity under existing leadership, shifting toward U.S. alignment. Vice President Delcy Rodríguez has already assumed acting presidency. A new leadership team—likely still drawn from Chavista circles—would need to become more U.S.-friendly, including curtailing ties and transactions with Cuba, China, Russia, and Iran. Think of this as a pragmatic, soft authoritarian transition rather than a full military junta.
- Military-backed elections. The challenge here is Venezuela’s brain drain: millions of professionals and opponents fled under Chávez and Maduro. Would an election allow the roughly 8 million exiles to vote? If yes, it could sweep in genuine change. If not, voters might still opt for continuity if it promises stability (or subsidies). This scenario depends heavily on U.S. pressure and internal negotiations.
- Least likely (but worst-case): Chaos akin to post-Gaddafi Libya. A descent into civil war would be a major setback for the Trump administration—triggering refugee flows, regional instability, and potential oil price spikes. So far, reports indicate relative calm, reducing this risk in the short term.
On the economic side, particularly energy markets: Who stands to profit? Initial market reactions point to U.S. oil companies as potential beneficiaries. Venezuela holds the world’s largest proven reserves, yet production and exports have plummeted due to crumbling infrastructure and sanctions. Reopening the sector to U.S. investment could boost output of heavy sour crude—perfect for Gulf Coast refineries—and prove bearish for oil prices longer-term.
That said, will majors really commit significant capex with WTI hovering in the $55–60 range? They haven’t exactly flooded into Canada’s oil sands, the Permian, or even Saudi projects at similar prices. If investment does flow to Venezuela, will it be additive (great for oilfield services firms) or cannibalize spending elsewhere—like Brazilian deepwater or Alberta heavy oil?
It’s far too early for firm conclusions on the energy sector’s outlook. We’ll gain clarity as the political picture stabilizes, but I strongly caution against jumping to investment decisions based on weekend headlines.
Clear winners so far:
- Guyana: No longer faces territorial threats from Venezuela and can ramp up its own massive offshore oil exports.
- Regional stability: Paramilitary and criminal groups funded by Caracas should see resources dry up, benefiting Colombia and Peru (both with elections this year—watch for pro-U.S. shifts).
- U.S. Gulf refiners: Prime positioning to process discounted Venezuelan heavy crude, displacing flows to China.
Obvious losers:
- Cuba: Heavily reliant on Venezuelan oil and financial support; the regime in Havana could face existential pressure.
- Canada: As the top supplier of heavy crude to U.S. refiners, it loses leverage in upcoming USMCA talks.
This list is hardly exhaustive. The political fallout from this weekend’s events will unfold over weeks and months, and I have far more questions than answers:
- Will the administration renew a serious push for Greenland, emboldened by this success?
- Might smaller nations accelerate nuclear ambitions, perceiving deterrence as protection against similar interventions?
- Could this unsettle leaders like Zelenskyy, wondering if adversaries might attempt parallel operations?
- Is Colombia or Cuba next in line for pressure?
- Will foreign holders of U.S. Treasuries grow nervous about dollar weaponization?
- Might smaller countries feel compelled to accommodate larger neighbors (e.g., in Southeast Asia or Latin America)?
